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Abstract 
The U.S. Defense community denotes an ecosystem of system or software component 
producers, system integrators, and customer organizations. For a variety of reasons this 
community now embraces the need to utilize open source software (OSS) and proprietary 
closed source software (CSS) in the system capabilities or software components it acquires, 
design, develops, deploys, and sustains. But the long-term transition to agile and adaptive 
capabilities that integrate bespoke or legacy, OSS and CSS components, has surfaced a 
number of issues that require acquisition-research-led approaches and solutions. In this 
paper, we identify and describe six key issues now found in the Defense software ecosystem: 
(1) unknown or unclear software architectural representations; (2) how to best deal with 
diverse, heterogeneous software IP licenses; (3) how to address cybersecurity requirements; 
(4) challenges arising in software integration and release pipelines; (5) how OSS evolution 
patterns transform software IP and cybersecurity requirements; and (6) the emergence of 
new business models for software distribution, cost accounting, and software distribution. We 
use the domain of command and control systems under different acquisition scenarios as our 
focus to help illuminate these issues along the way. We close with suggestions for how to 
resolve them. 
Introduction 
The U.S. Defense community, which includes the military services and civilian-
staffed agencies, is among the world’s largest acquirers of commodity and bespoke 
(custom) software systems. The Defense community further extends its reach and influence 
on a global basis through national treaties and international alliances through enterprises 
like NATO. The Department of Defense (DoD), other government agencies, and most large-
scale business enterprises continually seek new ways to improve the functional capabilities 
of their software-intensive systems while lowering acquisition costs. The acquisition of open 
architecture (OA) systems that can adapt and evolve through replacement of functionally 
similar software components is an innovation that can lead to lower cost systems with more 
powerful functional capabilities. OA system acquisition, development, and deployment are 
thus seen as an approach to realizing Better Buying Power (BPP) goals for lowering system 
costs, achieving technical excellence, enabling innovation, and advancing the acquisition 
workforce (Kendall, 2015).  
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Bespoke software systems are produced and integrated within the Defense 
community. In addition Defense system acquisition or procurement enterprises also obtain 
wares from most non-Defense industry providers of software systems, applications, or 
services (i.e., the mainstream software products or services industry). The acquisitions often 
entail software procurement or development contracts valued in the millions to hundreds-of-
millions of dollars (Myers & Obendorf, 2001). At this scale of endeavor and economic value, 
certain kinds of software engineering (SE) research problems arise that are not visible or are 
insignificant in smaller scale SE R&D efforts.  
In this paper, we focus attention to the slice of this world that focuses on the 
development and deployment of software-intensive command, control, communication, 
cyber and business systems (hereafter, C3CB). We further limit our focus to the most 
general software elements found in C3CB system capabilities; for example, software 
infrastructure components, common development technologies supporting app/widget 
development, and mission-specific apps/widgets, in particular widgets produced with the 
Ozone Widget Framework (Conley et al., 2014). OWF (now called the Ozone Platform or 
OZP) was initially developed by the NSA, though is now identified as Government OSS 
(GOSS) and supported by a third-party contractor. It is widely used within the Defense and 
Intelligence community. The growing importance of OZP within the Defense community has 
directed focus to the production and integration of C3CB system capabilities to be 
assembled using it. This focus drives open discussion of and broad exposure to emerging 
research issues that arise from the production and integration (or software engineering—
SE) of software components, and these in turn raise challenges for acquisition management 
and personnel. Specifically, we draw attention to issues surrounding the development, 
integration, and deployment of multi-version and multi-variant software systems composed 
from various open source software (OSS) and proprietary (CSS) software elements or 
remote services (Scacchi, 2002, 2010), eventually including recent efforts to support Web-
compatible services and/or mobile devices in C3CB. This focus also provides exposure to 
future C3CB system capabilities composed from apps acquired through various acquisition 
regimes, including apps downloaded from different Defense community app stores (George, 
Morris, O’Neil, et al., 2013; George et al., 2014).  
Recent Scenarios for Acquisition of OA Software Capabilities 
Interest in open source software (OSS) within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
and military services first appeared more than 10 years ago (Bollinger, 2003; Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2008). More recently, it has become clear that the U.S. Defense community has 
committed to a strategy of acquiring software-intensive systems across the board that 
require or utilize an “open architecture” (OA) which may incorporate OSS technology or OSS 
development processes that can help Defense customer organizations to achieve better 
buying power (Kendall, 2015). Why? Among the reasons identified is the desire to realize 
more choices among software component producers or integrators, as producers and 
integrators often act in ways that lock their customer organizations into overly costly and 
sometimes underperforming and difficult to sustain systems. One approach being explored 
focuses attention to agile and adaptive OA software components that are acquired and 
assembled (integrated) as C3CB system capabilities (assembled capabilities or AC) that are 
acquired and shared by multiple parties via independent “lines of efforts” acting within an 
ecosystem of producers, integrators, and consumer organizations (Reed et al., 2014; 
Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015). The goals of the AC approach include a shorter delivery and 
update cycle for mission components and an improved cybersecurity posture. We explain 
this approach as follows. 
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The AC approach contemplates independent acquisition lines of effort for different 
types of OA software components that can be acquired from independent providers: 
 Mission Components enable C3CB processes and present common 
operating picture data to end-users. Mission components may be realized as 
apps/widgets that may be deployed on mission-specific platforms, including 
those operating on secured Web/mobile devices. 
 Common Development Technology provides AC development tools and 
common run-time applications servers that support the mission components. 
The servers are bundled with Shared Infrastructure, as follows. 
 Shared Infrastructure Components combine local/remote application servers 
and data repositories with networking services and platforms.  
Assembled capabilities therefore represent alternative configurations of mission-
specific components that are produced with common development technology for 
deployment on shared infrastructure technology platforms. 
Independent Lines of Effort (LOEs) by single or multi-party acquisition for mission 
components, common development technologies, or shared infrastructure components, are 
expected to greatly accelerate development and fielded deployment. This acceleration 
entails tradeoffs in increased dependency and risk management. Independent LOEs enable 
at least three alternative scenarios for acquiring OA C3CB system capabilities. 
1. Use current strategy and acquisition capabilities. Here there is no focus on 
AC that utilizes mission components, common development technologies, or 
shared infrastructure components. 
2. Augment deployed systems with mission components and common 
technologies. Augmentation is either for (a) new mission functionality; (b) 
modernization “in place” so that part of the original system is deprecated as 
the new mission components are delivered; or (c) infrastructure replacement 
over parts of original system that may be combined with modernization 
efforts. 
3. Focus efforts on production, integration, security assurance, and deployment 
of mission components that use common technologies and shared 
infrastructure, and that can be assembled into different ACs. This can entail 
production, integration, and delivery of all mission components in one 
contract vehicle; or alternatively, the delivery of mission components 
partitioned across multiple acquisition contract vehicles, so as to spread and 
manage risk, while insuring multi-party buy-in commitment. 
The following efforts provide examples where these alternative C3CB acquisition 
scenarios can be considered. First, the Air Force’s Theater Battle Management Core 
System–Force Level (TBMCS-FL), which manages air tasking orders and airspace 
management, among other things, is being harvested for current operational capabilities. 
These capabilities can then be encapsulated and delivered as mission components for other 
C3CB systems, using OZP widgets and supporting common technologies. The C2AOS C2IS 
acquisition scenario also intends to deliver harvested functionality as mission components. 
Air Force AOC (Air Operations Center) is planning to include C2AOS C2IS as the 
replacement for TBMCS-FL, and will use the Navy ACS (hence indicating the need for multi-
party acquisition agreements). This in turn implies the need for Joint C2, and needs to be 
copied to all Services. It represents an opportunity to reduce duplicate activities for 
producing equivalent C3CB system capabilities. Second, the Army’s Distributed Common 
Ground System (DCGS-A) currently uses mission components for visualization (over 300 
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widgets available). DCGS-A will incorporate metadata mission components that utilize the 
DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB). Third and last, the Navy is deploying CANES and ACS 
(Agile Core Services) shared infrastructure to its fleet as a modernization effort (Guertin, 
Sweeney, & Schmidt, 2015).  
There are now a number of policy directives within the Defense community that 
formally recognize that OSS system elements can be treated as commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) components, and that bespoke software system development projects will utilize an 
OA, unless otherwise justified and approved. Thus, developing contemporary C3CB that 
incorporate both OSS and new/legacy CSS elements are “business as usual.” However, 
many legacy Defense community system capability producers are hesitant about how best 
to engineer such OA/OSS systems. For example, does an OA system imply/require that its 
software architecture be explicitly modeled, be accessible for sharing/reuse (e.g., as a 
Reference Model), and be modeled in a form/notation that is amenable to architectural 
analysis and computational processing (“Software Architecture,” 2016)? Therefore, we can 
begin to identify what kinds of SE research issues can be observed and investigated within 
the Defense community associated with its transition to OA systems and OSS software 
elements, specifically for Web and Mobile devices within the realm of C3CB.  
OA, Open APIs, OSS, and CSS 
OA C3CB system capabilities are assembled with mission components, common 
development technologies, and infrastructure. Infrastructure components are broadly 
construed to include non-mission specific software functionality or operations. Such 
components can include computer operating systems, Web servers, database management 
systems, cloud services, mobile device management middleware, and others, along with 
desktop, mobile, or smartphone-based Web browsers, word processors, email and 
calendaring, text/voice chat, and end-user media players. Example infrastructure 
components include the U.S. Army’s Common Operating Environment (COE), the Navy’s 
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprises Services (CANES) Afloat Core Services 
(ACS) (Guertin, Sweeney, & Schmidt, 2015), and similar elements in the Joint Intelligence 
Environment.  
Common development technologies are common software development tools, 
libraries, or frameworks used to implement the necessary software functionality so that new 
or legacy mission components can be integrated into mission-specific software capabilities. 
Software technology frameworks (or common implementation libraries) like Oracle Java 8, 
Ozone Platform, OpenJDK (OSS Java Development Kernel for Android app development), 
and the NASA World Wind Java SDK; programming languages like Java or C++; and 
scripting languages like Javascript may be utilized as common development technologies 
for developing mission components. Other software production capabilities like the Navy 
Tactical Cloud and CANES integrate both infrastructure and common development tools like 
Hadoop, MapReduce, and other mission data analysis tools for the Tactical Cloud, and the 
Agile Core Services and Java for CANES. 
Mission components represent a hybrid assortment of (a) simple widgets—small, thin 
apps similar in spirit to those acquired and downloaded from online app stores (like a clock, 
calculator, dictionary, sticky note, or unit converter); (b) singular widgets—more substantial 
functional components either created new (bespoke) or extracted from legacy systems that 
must run on a specific local computing platform (e.g., shipboard fire control system); or (c) 
compound widgets—hosted in a cloud and run as a remote cloud service over a 
single/multi-tiered client-server software architecture (e.g., Google Maps, NASA World 
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Wind), and thus potentially accessible and usable on a Web/mobile computing platform 
(Google Chrome Web browser running on a secure Android mobile device). 
OA seems to simply suggest software system architectures incorporating OSS/CSS 
infrastructure, common development technologies, and mission components that all utilize 
open application program interfaces (APIs). But not all software system architectures 
incorporating OSS/CSS components and open APIs will produce an OA, since whether an 
architecture is an OA depends on (a) how/why OSS/CSS and open APIs are located within 
it; (b) how OSS/CSS and open APIs are implemented, embedded, or interconnected within 
it; (c) whether the copyright (Intellectual Property) licenses assigned to different OSS/CSS 
components encumber all/part of the architecture into which they are integrated; and (d) 
choices among alternative architectural configurations and APIs that may or may not 
produce an OA (cf. Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). This can lead to situations in which 
acquisition contracts stipulate a software-intensive system with an OA and OSS/CSS 
components, but the resulting software system may or may not embody an OA. This can 
occur when the architectural design of a system constrains the system requirements: if not 
all requirements can be satisfied by a given system architecture, if requirements stipulate 
specific types or instances of OSS/CSS (e.g., Web browsers, content management servers), 
if an architecture style (Bass, Clements, & Kazman, 2003) is implied by given system 
requirements, or if requirements are implied by the choice to incorporate legacy software 
capabilities with one architectural style that are to be wrapped within mission-specific 
widgets with a different architectural style.  
Application domain of interest: C3CB with Web/Mobile Devices Utilizing Widgets 
C3CB are common information system applications that support modern military operations 
at a regional, national, or global level. These applications may be focused to address 
common military mission planning, mapping, resource status tracking and scheduling, 
mission performance, and monitoring activities through application sub-systems. However, 
closely related C3CB systems applications are also in common use within civilian/public 
safety agencies, public infrastructure/utility operations, live television and sports event 
broadcasting, massively multi-player online game operations centers, and even in 
international motorsports racing competition events like Formula 1. So the study of software 
production and system integration issues arising in the Defense community can inform 
awareness of similar issues in other non-Defense software system domains, and vice versa. 
Modern C3CB applications are increasingly expected/planned to be composed from 
best-available software components, whether OSS or CSS, utilizing bespoke or legacy 
software capabilities. Furthermore, as smartphones, tablets and laptop computers are being 
brought into the workplace, so too is interest increasing within the Defense community in 
supporting the acquisition and development of Web-compatible widgets and mobile apps, 
provided through an emerging ecosystem of component producers and system integrators, 
for configuration into secure OA C3CB software system capabilities (George et al., 2014; 
Reed et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2014; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a; Scacchi &Alspaugh, 
2015). Common software elements for such systems include Web browsers open to 
extensions like custom mission-specific Map widgets, and remote content servers, email and 
calendaring, word processing, local/networked file servers, and operating systems. The data 
processed by the software may be of high-relevance to military missions/operations, or may 
just be the daily grind of data manipulated by “productivity” applications which most of us 
use routinely to perform/enact our work assignments. Security has been mostly addressed 
through system isolation or “air gaps” to the outside world due, for example, to airborne or 
afloat capability deployments. But this is no longer common practice, and cybersecurity 
concerns have risen to the top of functional and non-functional requirements for all such 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 168 - 
C3CB applications. New OA systems are now required to be secure by design, by 
implementation, and through release, deployment and evolution, as well as subject to 
independent testing and certification. Secure OA designs can then entail different schemes 
for encapsulating different (sets of) components, use of virtualization schemes, shims and 
wrappers, encrypting data transfers and storage, and configuring multi-level system access 
capabilities. But we have found examples in which different OA system designs and 
configurations propagate security obligations, and privacy protections and access rights are 
either mediated or nullified by different software component IP licenses or system updates. 
OA Ecosystems Within the Defense Community 
In our view, a software ecosystem is a network of software component producers, 
system integrators, and customer organizations. In the Defense community, producers and 
integrators are commonly industrial entities (defense contractors), while customer 
organization are military program offices. Figure 1 presents an abstract view of a software 
ecosystem that associates software components or apps with their producers, system 
architectures with system integrators, and delivered component or integrated application 
systems with their customers. We also add annotations to indicate that each component or 
app has its own software IP license, and that integrated systems delivered to customers 
come with some composition of IP license obligations and rights propagated through the 
system’s OA. 
 
 An Abstract Software Ecosystem Rendered as a Network of Software 
Component Producers, Integrators of Systems/AC, and End-User 
Consumer Organizations 
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There is growing interest within the Defense community in transitioning to acquiring 
complex software system capabilities via an agile and adaptive ecosystem (Reed et al., 
2012; Reed et al., 2014; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015), where components may be sourced 
from alternative producers or integrators, allowing for more competition, and ideally lowering 
costs and improving the quality of software elements that arise from a competitive 
marketplace (Kendall, 2015). But this adaptive agility to mix, match, reuse, mashup, swap, 
or reconfigure integrated systems, or to accommodate end-user architecting (Garlan et al., 
2012) as in-house integrations of mission components, requires that systems be compatible 
with or designed to utilize an OA. Consequently, we can identify six kinds of emerging 
research challenges or issues for software capability acquisition that we have observed 
within the U.S. Defense community as they move to produce, integrate, deploy and evolve 
OA systems for C3CB system capabilities that utilize contemporary OSS and 
bespoke/legacy CSS components. These issues center around (1) unclear representations 
of OA software system capabilities, (2) how best to accommodate diverse intellectual 
property licenses when combining bespoke/legacy OSS/CSS mission components, (3) how 
to accommodate diverse and complicated cybersecurity requirements, (4) technical 
challenges arising from alternative ways to integrate and deploy diverse software 
components, (5) how to accommodate many different paths within the Defense community 
that drive software component evolution, and (6) how to estimate and manage the costs of 
acquiring, deploying, and sustaining diverse software-based mission components and C3CB 
system capabilities. These are examined in the next section.  
With this background and sets of concepts for understanding a simplified view of the 
world of C3CB software systems, we now turn to identify and examine a set of issues that 
are now recurring in the acquisition, design, development, and deployment of such systems. 
Emerging Issues in Developing and Deploying OA C3CB Systems Within 
Different Acquisition Scenarios  
There are at least six kinds of emerging research challenges or issues for software 
capability acquisition that we have observed within the U.S. Defense community as it moves 
to OA systems for C3CB system capabilities.  
Unknown or Unclear OA Solutions 
An OA entails a documented representation of software capability described in an 
architectural description language that specifies component types, component 
interconnections and connector types, open APIs, and their properties and 
interrelationships. The common core of a C3CB system OA resembles most enterprise 
business systems, as C3CB are a kind of management information system for navigating, 
mapping, tracking resources; scheduling people and other resources; producing plans and 
documentation; and supporting online email, voice, or video communications. Figure 2 
depicts an OA representation that can also serve as a “reference model” for a C3CB 
software product line (Womble et al., 2011). Figure 3 further expands the sub-architecture of 
software components that denote configurations of mission-specific components as widgets. 
Thus, C3CB system capabilities can compose or reuse multiple or nested OA reference 
models.  
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 OA Reference Model for Common Software Component Types 
Note. This is an OA reference model for common software component types including 
widgets interconnected within integrated C3CB system capability. Components come from 
producers that are assembled into OA C3CB capabilities by system integrators. 
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 OA Reference Model for Common Types of Software Widget 
Components 
Note. This figure is an OA reference model for common types of software widget components 
that can be connected and integrated to realize mission-specific C3CB system capabilities, 
within the overall OA shown on the left-side in Figure 2. Servers may be secured Web 
content servers, app servers, databases, or file system servers/repositories. 
The next piece of the OA challenge we are studying is the envisioned transition with 
the Defense community to C3CB system capabilities being composed by end-user system 
integration architects (Garlan et al., 2012) working within/for customer organizations, or 
potentially extended by end-users deployed in the field. This is the concept that surrounds 
the transition to discovering software components, apps, or widgets in Defense customer 
organization app stores (George et al., 2013; George et al., 2014). These app stores are 
modeled after those used in distributing and acquiring software apps for Web-based or 
mobile devices, operated by Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others. How the availability of 
such Defense mission capability app stores will transform the way C3CB systems are 
produced, or even if legacy Defense industry contractors will produce them, remains to be 
seen. Said differently, how app stores transform OA software ecosystem networks, business 
models, and cybersecurity practices is an emerging challenge for acquisition and SE 
research in the Defense community. 
Another kind of challenge arises when acquiring new or retrofitting legacy C2 
software system applications that lack an open or explicit architectural representation 
identifying major components, interfaces, interconnections and remote services (if any). 
Though OA reference models and architectural description languages are in use within the 
SE research community, contemporary C3CB generally lack such descriptions or 
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representations that are open, sharable, or reusable. This may be the result of legacy 
business practices in the Defense community that see detailed software architecture 
representations as proprietary IP rather than as open, sharable technical data, even when 
OSS components are included or when applications sub-systems are entirely made of OSS 
code. An alternative explanation reveals that complex software systems like common Web 
browsers (Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Microsoft Internet Explorer) have 
complex architectures that integrate millions of SLOC that are not well understood, and that 
entail dozens of independently-developed software elements with complex APIs and IP 
licenses that shift across versions (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). For such systems the effort 
to produce an explicit OA reference model is itself a daunting architectural discovery, 
component/sub-system extraction, restructuring/refactoring, and continuous software 
evolution task (Choi & Scacchi, 1990; Kazman & Carriere, 1998). Thus, new ways and 
means for extracting software components interconnections and interfaces and transforming 
them into higher-level architectural representations of mission-specific apps/widget 
configurations are needed. 
Harvesting legacy source/executable binary code entails many software engineering 
challenges that constrain acquisition efforts. First, legacy code provides too much technical 
detail and comparatively little abstraction of overall system configuration, composition, 
components and interconnection/dependencies. Second, incongruent computational system 
models (e.g., legacy data-flow versus publish-subscribe widgets) or hybrid OA AC arise 
when transitioning legacy system software elements into new widget-based mission 
components. Third, there is a general inability to visualize or analyze (test, selectively 
execute, translate into another programming language, etc.) overall system configurations, 
interconnections, or interfaces. Fourth, lacking these three, the potential for general software 
reuse is limited to executable code reuse, which is the lowest common denominator for 
reuse. Such reuse results in substantial blocks of unused code that cannot be easily 
removed due to indiscernible interdependencies. Last, when configuring mission 
components that entail legacy C2 software applications wrapped for integration as widgets, 
different architectural styles can inadvertently be mixed (e.g., dataflow architecture for 
legacy C2 software, and publish-subscribe architecture for configured mission widgets), 
which in turns raises the potential for architectural mismatches (Velasco-Elizondo et al., 
2013) that may be difficult to determine or detect during system integration, especially when 
such integration activities are performed by end-user/consumer organizations. 
Heterogeneously Licensed OA Software Capabilities 
OSS components are subject to widely varying copyright, end-user license 
agreements, digital civil rights, or other IP protections. The Open Source Institute recognizes 
dozens of OSS licenses are in use, though the top 10 represents more than 90% of the 
open source ecosystem (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). This is especially true for OSS 
components or application systems that incorporate source code from multiple, independent 
OSS development projects, such as found in contemporary Web browsers like Firefox and 
Chrome which incorporate components from dozens of OSS projects, most with diverse 
licenses (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). This means that C3CB system capabilities that entail 
configuration of OSS/CSS components are subject to complex software IP obligations and 
rights that may defy tracking, or entail contradictory legal obligations or rights (Alspaugh, 
Scacchi & Asuncion, 2010). Determining overall IP obligations for such systems is generally 
beyond the scope of expertise for software developers, as well as most corporate lawyers. 
Furthermore, we have observed many ways in which IP licenses interact within an OA 
software system, such that different architectural design choices that configure the same set 
of software components result in different overall system obligations and rights. 
Understanding multiple license interaction and IP mismatches is far too confusing for most 
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acquisition professionals and Program Office decision-makers and a source of legal 
expense, or alternatively expensive indemnification insurance policies by the software 
producers or system integrators. 
One complication that can be anticipated here arises when component types are 
replaced with versioned component instance alternatives (Scacchi & Alspaugh 2012). 
Consider the situation where a Web Browser (e.g., Firefox 40.0.3 or Chrome 47.0.2526.111 
(64-bit); etc.) component has a specific IP license (e.g., Mozilla Public License 2.0 or GPL 
3.0) associated with the versioned instance, which in turn may be viewed by system 
integrators as enabling/limiting an integrated system’s architectural design, depending on 
how different components are interconnected in ways that may or may not propagate (un-) 
desirable IP obligations and rights—a concern that arises frequently when using 
components subject to the GPL (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). As we have learned in 
practice, corporate lawyers employed by Defense contractors or in government agencies do 
not have solutions for how to resolve such complexities, except via costly overall liability 
indemnification schemes, and efforts to distribute integrated systems with many IP 
obligations and few rights that effectively make an integrated open source system closed. 
This in turn can defeat the potential opportunities and benefits for commitment to OA 
systems that integrate OSS components. 
Bespoke/legacy software components for OA AC design, integration and delivery 
within widgets will be subject to their bespoke/legacy IP obligations. This may include limits 
on the right to extract, restructure, or reengineer their architecture (cf. Choi & Scacchi, 1990; 
Kazman & Carriere, 1998) into open source formats. Similarly, IP licenses associated with 
OSS or new CSS components may impinge on their integration with these legacy 
components, or may limit disclosure of their interfaces that would allow more open 
integration of alternative software AC configurations developed by different Defense 
community component producers (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). 
Nonetheless, in our view, OA software ecosystems are defined, delimited, and 
populated with niches that locate specific integrated system solutions (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 
2012). Furthermore, we see that these niches effectively have virtual IP licenses that must 
be calculated via the obligations and rights that propagated across integrated system 
component licenses via union, intersection, and subsumption relations among them 
(Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). Such calculation may appear to be daunting, and thus begs for 
a simpler, tractable, and computationally enforced scheme that can scale to large systems 
composed from many components, as well as be practically usable by C3CB system 
capability producers, integrators, and acquisition professionals. In such a scheme, 
OSS/CSS licenses could formalize IP obligations as operational requirements (i.e., 
computationally enforceable, at the integrated system level) instantiated by system 
integration architects (Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010; Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2013). 
Similarly, customer/user rights are then non-functional requirements that can be realized 
and validated as access/update capabilities propagated across the integrated system 
(Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2013). 
Cybersecurity for OA Software Capabilities  
Cybersecurity is a high priority requirement in all C3CB systems, applications, AC, 
and platforms (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013c; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013d). No longer is 
cybersecurity something to be addressed after C3CB systems are developed and 
deployed—cybersecurity must be included throughout the design, development, 
deployment, and evolution of C3CB. However, the best ways and means for addressing 
cybersecurity requirements are unclear, and oftentimes somewhat at odds with one another 
depending on whether cybersecurity capability designs are specific to a C3CB platform 
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(e.g., operating system or processor virtualization; utilization of low-level operating system 
access control or capability mechanisms); component producer (secure programming 
practices and verification testing); system integrator (e.g., via use secure data 
communications protocols and data encryption); customer deployment setting (mobile: 
airborne or afloat; fixed: offices, briefing rooms, operations centers); end-user authentication 
mechanisms; or acquisition policy (e.g., reliance on third-party audit, certification, and 
assurance of system cybersecurity). However, in reviewing these different arenas for 
cybersecurity, we have found that the cybersecurity requirements or capabilities can be 
expressed in much the same way as IP licenses: using concise, testable formal expressions 
of obligations and rights. Some examples follow (capital letters are placeholders that denote 
specified system, service, or component contexts): 
 The obligation that a user must verify his/her authority by password or other 
specified authentication process. 
 The obligation that all components connected to specified component C must 
grant it the capability to read and update data in compartment T. 
 The obligation to reconfigure a system in response to detected threats, when 
given the right to select and include different component versions, or 
executable component variants. 
 The right that a user or software component may read and update data in 
compartment T using the licensed component. 
 The right that may allow replacement of a specified component C with some 
other vetted component. 
These examples show how cybersecurity requirements can be expressed or 
paraphrased in restricted natural language (e.g., using a domain-specific language) into 
composite specifications that denote “security licenses” (Alspaugh, Scacchi & Asuncion, 
2010; Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). In this way, it should be possible to develop new software 
analysis tools whose purpose is to interpret cybersecurity obligations as operational 
constraints (executable) or provided capabilities (access control or update privileges), 
through mechanisms analogous to those used for analyzing software licenses (Alspaugh, 
Scacchi & Asuncion, 2010; Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012), and show how component or sub-
system-specific obligations and rights can be propagated across a system’s architecture.  
We similarly envision the ability for OA system capabilities to be produced and 
integrated according to different cybersecurity requirements, depending on where and how 
they are deployed (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013d). For example, in Figure 4 we show one 
possible layout of software components that confines different sub-configurations within 
different virtual machines. These virtual machines may also be hierarchically nested, as is 
the case when mission-specific widgets that entail legacy C2 applications must be securely 
confined at run time in order to access remote servers, in contrast to a secured Web 
browser running on a secured mobile device. 
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 A Configuration of Security Confinement Vessels that Encapsulate 
Infrastructure Software Components and Mission-Specific Widgets for the 
OA Shown in Figures 2 and 3 
Last, the inclusion of OSS or new CSS components within future OA C3CB software 
systems or AC will be amenable to current approaches to cybersecurity assurance, as we 
have outlined before (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013d). Mission components can be assessed 
for cybersecurity characteristics, and assembled, without triggering reaccreditation. 
Similarly, evolutionary support for field-deployed AC can allow rapid substitution of mission 
components that enable rapid, agile response to cybersecurity issues in mission 
components. However, legacy CSS components which were developed and deployed 
before current cybersecurity assurance challenges will need to rely on “air-gap” interfaces at 
deployment time that may be vulnerable to aggressive exploits delivered through mobile 
devices.  
Consequently, we believe that cybersecurity can be addressed in the future using 
explicit, computational OA representations that are attributed with both IP and cybersecurity 
obligations and rights. 
Software Component Build, Release, Deployment (BRD) Processes 
C3CB applications represent complex software systems that are often challenging to 
produce, especially when conceived as bespoke systems. To no surprise, acquisition of 
these systems often requires a development life cycle approach, though some system 
elements may be fully-formed components that are operational as packaged software (e.g., 
commercial database management systems, Web browsers, Web servers, user interface 
development kits/frameworks). C3CB development is rarely clean-sheet and less likely to be 
so in the future. As a result, component-based system development approaches are 
expected to dominate, thus relegating system integrators (or even end-users) to perform any 
residual source code development, inter-app integration scripting, or intra-app extension 
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script development. But software process challenges arise along the way (Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2013b).  
First is again the issue noted earlier of whether there is an explicit, open-source OA 
design representation, preferably one that is not just a diagram, but instead is expressed in 
an architectural design language. With only a diagram or less, then is little or no guidance 
for how to determine whether a resulting software implementation is verifiable or compliant 
with its OA requirements or acquisition policies, such as provision or utilization of 
standardized, open APIs to allow increased software reuse, selection of components from 
alternative producers, or post-deployment extensions (Kendall, 2015). 
Second is the issue arising from system development practices based on utilization 
of software components, integrated sub-systems, or turnkey application packages. These 
software elements come with their own, possibly unknown requirements that are 
nonetheless believed to exist and be knowable with additional effort (Alspaugh & Scacchi, 
2013). They also come with either OSS code or CSS executables, along with their 
respective APIs. These components must be configured to align with the OA specification. 
Consequently, software tool chains or workflow automation pipelines are utilized to build and 
package internal/external executable, version-controlled software releases. We have found 
many diverse automated software process pipelines are used across and sometimes within 
software integration activities (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013b). These pipelines take in OSS 
code files, dependent libraries, or repositories (e.g., GitHub) and build executable version 
instances that are then subjected to automated testing regimes that include simple “smoke 
tests” and extensive regression testing. Successful builds eventually turn into packaged 
releases that may or not be externally distributed and deployed as ready-to-install 
executables. While this all seems modest and tractable, when one sees the dozens of 
different OSS tools used in different combinations across different target platforms it 
becomes clear that what is simple when small becomes a complex SE activity when the 
scale of deployment increases.  
Another complication, which is now beginning to be recognized within and across 
BRD processes and process automation pipelines, arises in determining when and how 
different BRD tool chain versions/configurations can mediate cybersecurity requirements in 
the target system being built. We have seen cases in which software builds and deployed 
releases are assumed to integrate to functionally equivalent CSS components, but which 
are then not included in releases due to IP restrictions. We have also observed and reported 
how functionally equivalent variants as well as functionally similar versions may or may not 
be produced by BRD tool chains, either by choice or by unintentional consequence. This, in 
our opinion, gives rise to the need for explicit open-source models of BRD process 
automation pipelines that can be analyzed, tested, reused, and shared to determine whether 
release versions/variants can be verified and/or validated to produce equivalent/similar 
releases that preserve prior cybersecurity obligations and usage rights. 
Last, mixing new OSS and CSS components with legacy apps wrapped within 
widgets will complicate build and release processes and obscure deployment processes. 
Legacy apps encapsulated within mission-specific widgets will commonly need to 
dynamically link executable binary components, which in turn increases the challenges in 
their testing and cybersecurity assurance, both during development and during field 
deployment. In order to mitigate these technical challenges while enabling more agile 
software component system integration, multi-component OA configurations should explicitly 
declare pre/post conditions on acceptable input/output parameter values, along with 
exceptional values, that in turn can be independently verified or validated. 
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Software Component Evolution Practices Transmitted Across the OA 
Ecosystem 
Software evolution is among the most-studied of SE processes. While formerly 
labeled as “software maintenance,” a profitable activity mediated through maintenance 
contracts from software producers to customers, the experience of OSS development 
projects and practices suggest a transition to a world of continuous software development—
one that foreshadows the emergence of continuous SE processes, or software life cycles 
that just keep cycling until interest falters or spins off into other projects. OSS development 
projects rely on OSS tools that themselves are subject to ongoing development, 
improvement, and extension, as are the software platforms, libraries, code-sharing 
repositories, and end-user applications utilized by OSS developers to support their 
development work. Developers entering, progressing, or migrating within/across OSS 
projects further diversify the continuous development of the most successful and widely 
used OSS components/apps. This dynamism in turn produces many ways for OSS systems 
or OA systems that incorporate OSS components to evolve. 
Figure 5 portrays different software evolution patterns, paths, and practices we have 
observed arising with new C3CB applications (Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012). Here we see 
paths from a currently deployed, executable system release, to a new deployed release—
something most of us now accept as routine as software updates are propagated across the 
Internet from producers, through integrators, to customers and end-users. 
 
 Different Paths and Mechanisms Through Which OA Software Systems 
Can Evolve  
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012) 
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Integrated OA systems can evolve through upgrades of functionally equivalent 
component variants (patches) as well as through substitution of functionally similar software 
components sourced from other producers or integrators. In Figure 6, we show a generic 
situation that entails identifying how an OA consistent with that depicted in Figure 2 may 
accommodate the substitution and replacement of a locally installed word processor 
application with a remote Web-based word processing software services (for example, 
Google Docs or Microsoft Office 365). This capability is a result of utilizing an OA that 
constitutes a reference model aligned with a vendor-neutral software product line. This is 
also a capability sought by customer organizations, and sometimes encouraged by software 
producers to accommodate their evolving business models (discussed below). While the OA 
remains constant, the location of the component has moved from local to remote/virtual, as 
has its evolutionary path. Similarly, the cybersecurity of the local versus remote component 
has changed in ways that are unclear, and entail a different, evolved assurance scheme. 
 
 Alternative Configurations of Integrated Instance Releases of 
Components Consistent With the OA in Figure 2 That Are Treated as 
Functionally Equivalent by Customer Organizations  
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012) 
Next, any common development technology used to support production or 
integration of mission components with shared infrastructure components must recognize 
that these technologies and components are all subject to independent, mostly autonomous 
evolution practices within the Defense community. For example, OZP is currently 
undergoing evolution, including its migration to Java 8 sourced by Oracle, and this move will 
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may disrupt the correct operation of widgets already produced using Java 7 common 
development technologies. Similarly, new OSS and CSS components will evolve due to 
practices arising in the competitive marketplace, while legacy mission components wrapped 
within widgets will have obscure or opaque evolution practices that are locked into legacy 
Defense community component providers. Legacy components will also limit how their 
encapsulating widgets evolve, potentially due to architectural mismatches or dependencies 
to legacy systems that are no longer supported, operational, or compatible with current 
platform technologies (Velasco-Elizondo et al., 2013). 
Overall, the evolution of software components, component licenses, component 
interconnects and interconnections, and interconnected component or AC configurations are 
now issues that call for research efforts to help make such patterns, paths, and practices 
more transparent, tractable, manageable, and scalable within an OA software ecosystem, 
as well as customers seeking the benefits of openness, sharing, and reuse. 
New Business Models for Acquisition of Software Components and Widgets 
The last issue we address is the newest in this set of six for consideration for new 
acquisition research. While the field of acquisition research and practice has long paid 
attention to software economics, the challenges of software cost estimation are evolving in 
light of new business models being put into practice by software producers and system 
integrators. In the past, software development projects were often managed by a single 
contractor responsible for both software production and system integration. Costs could be 
assessed through augmentation to internal business accounting practices (e.g., budgeting, 
staffing workloads, time-sheet reports, project schedules, etc.). But a move to OA 
ecosystems means that multiple producers can participate, and OA schemes accommodate 
switching among providers while a system is being integrated, deployed, or evolved in the 
field. This in turn coincides with new ways and means to electronically distribute software 
updates, components, or applications, as well as new ways to charge for software. OSS 
components may be acquired and distributed at “no cost,” but their integration and evolution 
are charged as service subscription, or as time-effort billings.  
We have already seen other alternatives for costing or charging for software that 
include franchising; enterprise licensing; metered usage; advertising supported; 
subscription; free component, paid service/support fees; federated reciprocity for shared 
development; collaborative buying; donation; sponsorship; free/open source software (e.g., 
Government OSS—GOSS); and others. So how are customer organizations, especially in 
the Defense community where software cost estimation practices are routine, supposed to 
estimate the development or sustaining costs of the software components or integrated 
systems they acquire and evolve, especially when an OA system allows for producers 
whose components come with different costing/billing schemes? This is an open problem for 
both acquisition research and software engineering practice. 
Overall, new OSS and CSS components are experiencing a rapid diversification of 
acquisition cost models and practices, while legacy components are generally tied to single-
source contractors as a result of utilizing legacy components as a cost-avoidance practice. 
All of the preceding five factors further obfuscate how to estimate or measure software 
component/AC development costs, schedules, or time to delivery/usage. So acquisition 
costs of systems that mix and match new OSS and bespoke CSS components, together 
with legacy CSS components, will be difficult to cost-estimate or cost-manage. This in turn 
will limit the efficacy of BBP 3.0 practices for such systems.  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Our study reported in this paper identifies a set of technical issues and risks that can 
dilute the cost-effectiveness of Better Buying Power efforts. It similarly suggests that current 
acquisition practices aligned with BBP can also give rise to acquisition management 
activities that can dominate and overwhelm the costs of OA system development. This 
adverse condition can arise through app/widget vetting, new software business models, 
opaque and/or underspecified acquisition management processes, and the evolving 
interactions of new software development and deployment techniques. Unless proactive 
investment in acquisition research and development can give rise to worked examples, 
open-source models, and new acquisition management system technologies, the likelihood 
of acquisition management dominating agile development and adaptive deployment of 
component-based OA C2 system capabilities is unsettling. 
Our research identified and analyzed how new software component technologies like 
OSS infrastructure components, common development technology components, and 
mission-specific widgets for Web-based and/or mobile devices, along with their intellectual 
property (IP) license and cybersecurity requirements, engineering and evolution processes, 
and cost estimating practices interact to drive down (or drive up) total system costs across 
the system acquisition life cycle. The availability of such new scientific knowledge and 
technological practices can give rise to more effective expenditures of public funds and 
improve the effectiveness of future software-intensive systems used in government and 
industry. Thus, a goal of this paper was to explore new ways and means for achieving cost-
sensitive acquisition of OA software systems, as well as identifying factors that can further 
decrease or increase the costs of such systems. 
We identified and examined six areas for research arising at the intersection of 
software engineering and acquisition that now confront the Defense community (and 
perhaps other industries as well). These six issues areas include (1) the lack of architecture 
representations and schemes for discovering or specifying OA system designs; (2) OA 
systems that integrate components or applications subject to diverse, heterogeneous IP 
licenses; (3) how to manage the cybersecurity of OA systems during system design, 
development, and deployment; (4) software process challenges and evolving disruptions in 
seemingly mundane process automation pipelines; (5) software evolution patterns, path, 
and practices in OA ecosystems; and (6) how new business models are upending software 
cost estimation practices and outcomes. All of these research areas are readily 
approachable, and research results are likely to have significant practical value, both within 
the Defense community and beyond. 
These issue areas were investigated and addressed in the domain of command, 
control, communication, cyber and business systems (C3CB). We believe all are tractable, 
yet dense and sufficient for deep sustained research study, as well as for applied research 
in search of near-term to mid-term practical results.  
In related work (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015), we have called for specific R&D 
investments into the development of open source, domain-specific languages for specifying 
open architecture representations (or architectural description languages) that are 
formalizable and computational, as well as supporting annotations for software license 
obligations and rights. While ADLs have been explored in the SE research community, the 
challenges of how software architectures mediate software component licenses and cyber 
security requirements are an open issue, with practical consequences. Similarly, ADL 
annotations that assign costs or cost models in line with new software business models are 
an open problem area. We have also called for R&D investment in new SE tools or support 
environments who purpose is to provide automated analysis and support of OA systems IP 
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and cybersecurity obligations and rights, as new requirements for industrial practice in large-
scale software acquisition, design, development, deployment, and evolution. Such 
environments are the automated tools that could be used to model, specify, and analyze 
dynamically configurable, component-based OA software systems expressed using the 
open source architectural representation schemes or ADLs noted here. 
Our research identifies and analyzes how OA CBC3 system capabilities can utilize 
software components and mission-specific widgets, with diverse IP license and 
cybersecurity requirements, and how new software business models can interact to affect 
total system costs across the system acquisition life cycle. The availability of such new 
scientific knowledge and technological practices can give rise to more effective expenditures 
of public funds and improve the effectiveness of future software-intensive systems used in 
Defense community, as well as elsewhere within government and industry. Hopefully, this 
paper serves to help throw light into how software engineering and acquisition research can 
inform and add benefit to software practices within the Defense community through ways 
and means that further advance Better Buying Power opportunities and outcomes. 
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